Published research images
Widely used public forensic corpora and teaching images with community-documented contents, so results can be checked against work published outside GhostKey.
Bloodhound ships with an autonomous validation suite that tests its parsers against known reference datasets and produces a signed validation report, giving you documented, defensible proof of tool reliability before anyone asks for it.
It is a fair question, and it gets asked under oath. The usual answer is a vendor assurance or an examiner’s own spot-check, carried out months after the work was done.
Our answer is a reproducible test run against datasets with known ground truth, executed by the same build of the software that processed your case, signed and dated.
A validation run only means something if the correct answer is known in advance. Bloodhound validates against curated datasets with documented ground truth: every record, every timestamp, every deliberately deleted row.
Widely used public forensic corpora and teaching images with community-documented contents, so results can be checked against work published outside GhostKey.
Handsets and disks populated under controlled, logged conditions: messages sent at recorded times, records deleted at recorded points, media captured at recorded coordinates.
Labs can register their own reference images and expected-result definitions, so the suite runs against the device populations and OS versions that lab sees in casework.
| Check class | What it asserts | Failure means |
|---|---|---|
| Image reader integrity | Bytes read from E01, raw, AFF4 and virtual disks match the source exactly | The container layer is unreliable, so nothing above it can be trusted |
| Record extraction | Parsers return every expected record, and no records that do not exist | Evidence is being missed, or invented by a faulty parser |
| Deleted recovery | Known-deleted rows are recovered and correctly labelled as deleted | Recovered material could be presented as live data |
| Timestamp normalisation | Times convert correctly across timezones, epochs and DST boundaries | The timeline is wrong, and so is anything concluded from it |
| Timeline ordering | Event ordering is stable and deterministic across repeated runs | Two examiners could produce different chronologies from one image |
| Hash-set matching | Known material matches, known-good is suppressed, no false positives | Alerting is unreliable in both directions |
| Custody enforcement | Ledger entries are written, chained and signed for every covered action | The custody guarantee is not holding |
| Determinism | Identical input produces byte-identical parsed output across runs and hosts | Results are not reproducible by a third party |
Each run produces a dated, signed PDF naming the build under test, the datasets used, and every check executed with its result. It is meant to be disclosed alongside the case report.
No build ships until the full suite passes on a clean, air-gapped host.
Run it on your own hardware after deployment to establish a local baseline.
Scheduled runs keep your documented reliability evidence current.
Re-run against the build used in a case and attach the fresh report to disclosure.
When a tool cannot demonstrate its own reliability, the examiner ends up carrying that burden personally, usually on the stand. We would rather the software carried it.
Evaluation licences include the validation suite and the reference datasets it runs against.